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(2011)

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Educational Philosophy and Theory, 43(6), pp. 663-674.

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<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-5812.2010.00698.x>

The Product of Text and “Other” Statements: discourse analysis and the critical use of Foucault

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Author pre-press of paper published in *Educational Philosophy & Theory*, 43(6), 663-674.

Abstract

Much has been written on Michel Foucault’s reluctance to clearly delineate a research method, particularly with respect to genealogy (Harwood 2000; Meadmore, Hatcher, & McWilliam 2000; Tamboukou 1999). Foucault (1994, p. 288) himself disliked prescription stating, “I take care not to dictate how things should be” and wrote provocatively to disrupt equilibrium and certainty, so that “all those who speak for others or to others” no longer know what to do. It is doubtful, however, that Foucault ever intended for researchers to be stricken by that malaise to the point of being unwilling to make an intellectual commitment to methodological possibilities. Taking criticism of “Foucauldian” discourse analysis as a convenient point of departure to discuss the objectives of poststructural analyses of language, this paper develops what might be called a discursive analytic; a methodological plan to approach the analysis of discourses through the location of statements that function with constitutive effects.

Keywords: Foucault, discourse analysis, qualitative research in education.

Different horses for different courses...

Discourse analysis is a flexible term. What one is doing is greatly dependent on the epistemological framework being drawn upon. It appears that many scholars using discourse analysis within a Foucauldian framework have adopted a ‘Foucauldianistic’ reticence to declare method, fearful perhaps of the charge of being prescriptive. There are those again who make references to “doing” discourse analysis and because they loosely link their analysis to motifs of power and sporadically cite Foucault, there is an assumption that this too is “Foucauldian” discourse analysis. In any case, it is quite difficult to find coherent descriptions of how one might go about “Foucauldian” discourse analysis, but perhaps the difficulty in locating concise descriptions is because there is no such thing? In this paper, the reasons why this might be so are discussed whilst the author engages with the awkward tension that arises when one attempts to do poststructural work using Foucault, while at the same time satisfying the conventions of academic writing and scholarship in education research.

Despite there being no model for discourse analysis *qua* Foucault, should one *claim* to be drawing on a Foucauldian framework there is a very real danger in one’s work being dismissed as *unFoucauldian* - *if* one doesn’t get it right. But how can one get it wrong when there are

supposedly no rules to follow? This is an interesting but precarious dilemma that can have an exclusionary effect (see O'Farrell 2005). Foucauldian theory is perceived as inaccessible and dangerous, which deters some researchers from engaging with this form of analysis, particularly those in more practice-oriented fields. The neoliberal malaise currently affecting universities (Davies 2005), which privileges so-called “evidence-based” research methods and causes some to caution against using the “F” word,¹ only compounds this problem.

As an umbrella term for anything vaguely left of far-right, “postmodernism” has been the whipping boy of the conservative Right in the Australian “culture wars” for over the past decade. For example in June 2007, the then Minister of Sport and The Arts, George Brandis MP delivered a sermon to visiting members of the Council of the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences (CHASS). Brandis attributed the decline in esteem (and government sponsorship) of the arts, humanities and social sciences to “academic practitioners who have, in seeking to understand human society, blundered down blind alleyways and fallen prey to the worship of false gods” (Brandis, 2007, p. 32). He continued to argue (to an affronted and rapidly diminishing audience) that in order to “recover their prestige” the humanities need to,

...embrace the standards of objective, rigorous scholarship that were once among their glories; to accept that critical inquiry is not well served when it is, whether admittedly or implicitly, regarded instrumentally, in service of some ideology or social philosophy, rather than as an end in itself... scholarship in the mainstream of the humanities has been degraded for the very reason that it was dominated by an instrumentalist method, to fit scholarly inquiry into an historical paradigm that the events of the late 20th century have utterly discredited. (Brandis 2007, p. 32)

As a key field in the social sciences and the potential “engine-room of the economy” (Rudd 2007), education has received a great deal of attention in the last few years in Australia. So too has educational research and scholarship, albeit for all the wrong reasons. Here too postmodernism is to blame for a perceived decline in standards:

Our thinking processes have been addled by postmodernism, with its insistence that nothing is better than anything else... The circuitous theories of French philosophers Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Roland Barthes arrived on our shores in the '70s and '80s to be widely misunderstood and misinterpreted. Soon they were being applied in even more half-baked form to teacher education and then to teaching in schools. The effect on young brains has been roughly the same as what would happen to an assembly line of Rolls-Royces if you poured glue into all the door locks... Two generations of experimented-upon young Australians have emerged unable to read, write and think with the skill and clarity they should have been able to assume would be theirs... Too often, under the postmodern influence, schooling has turned into a hatchery for baby airheads unable to think for themselves or communicate clearly... Whatever the original worth and intention of the movement, postmodernism, with its insistence that there are no such things as objective truths, knowledge or values, gave licence to far too many to take the easy way out. (Gare 2006, p. 29)

Not surprisingly the corrosive effect of such attacks, together with the vetoing of “postmodernist” Australian Research Council research grants by Federal Education Minister Brendon Nelson, have further deterred researchers in education from applying poststructural research methods. The recent growth in the use of mixed-methods and quasi-experimental design to answer questions more suited to qualitative methods, points towards an attempt by some to add a measure of “science-cred” to interpretive research, although this is not a new phenomenon as anyone familiar with discourse analysis will know.

Analysing “rigorously”

A number of years ago, Taylor (2004) provided an analysis of education policy documents using Critical Discourse Analysis.² In doing so, she argued that Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA),

is particularly appropriate for critical policy analysis because it allows a detailed investigation of the relationship of language to other social processes, and of how language *works* within power relations. CDA provides a framework for a *systematic* analysis – researchers can go beyond speculation and demonstrate how policy texts work. (original emphasis, Taylor 2004, p. 436)

In Taylor’s (2004) discussion, distinction is made between two approaches to discourse analysis. This is principally between CDA, which draws inferences from structural and linguistic features in texts, and discourse analysis said to be informed by the work of Foucault. The difference between the former, which Taylor (2004, p. 435) describes as paying “close attention to the linguistic features of texts” and the latter, described as “those which do not”, is perhaps more complex than this (see discussion in Wetherall 2001, p. 391-393). For a start, there are more than these two approaches to discourse analysis and other epistemological frameworks inform them (Wetherall, Taylor, & Yates 2001). Indeed, the common thread between analyses in the latter group is not Foucault at all. More germane to these approaches is a poststructural sensibility born of a “theorising that rests upon complexity, uncertainty and doubt and upon a reflexivity about its own production and its claims to knowledge about the social” (Ball 1995, p. 269).

The difference between CDA³ and poststructural theoretical approaches (using Foucault, Derrida and Lyotard among others) to discourse analysis may be found in the characteristic eschewing of claims to objectivity and truth by those in the latter tradition; for, as Edwards and Nicoll (2001, p. 105) point out, “the claim to truth can itself be seen as a powerful rhetorical practice.” Additionally, Humes and Bryce (original emphasis, 2003, p. 180) speak to the poststructuralist respect for uncertainty and the influence of key thinkers such as Derrida when they argue that, “the search for clarity and simplicity of meaning is seen as illusory because there will always be other perspectives from which to interpret the material under review. To seek a definitive account is, thus, a misguided undertaking.” As such, discourse analysis informed by Foucauldian or other poststructural theory endeavours to avoid the substitution of one ‘truth’ for another, recognising that “there can be no universal truths or absolute ethical positions [and hence]... belief in social scientific investigation as a detached, historical, utopian, truth-seeking process becomes difficult to sustain” (Wetherall 2001, p. 384).

Whilst poststructural accounts of meaning in language assert the “death of the author” (Barthes 1977b) because the potential for multiple reader interpretation/s has been established (Humes & Bryce 2003), this does not result in relativism. Nor licence “to take the easy way out” (Gare 2006, p. 29). Influenced by the key works of influential thinkers including Barthes (1977b), Lyotard (1984) and Derrida (Derrida 1967a; 1967b; 1982), as well as the inimitable Foucault, poststructuralists argue that “the process of analysis is always interpretive, always contingent, always a version or a reading from some theoretical, epistemological or ethical standpoint” (Wetherall 2001, p. 384). Understanding that meaning is an inherently unstable construct negotiated by and through the ‘cultural politics of the sign’ (Trifonas 2000, p. 275), methodologists from this tradition tend to discount the sovereignty of the author, destabilising the treasured relationship between signifier and signified (Peters 2004; Trifonas 2000), in the recognition that the reader has ultimate authority over interpretation and therefore meaning – not, in fact, the author.

Researchers drawing on Foucauldian ideas therefore do not speak of their research “findings”. They tend to use less emphatic language, recognising that truth is contingent upon the subjectivity of the reader and the fickleness of language. They would recognise the futility of trying to mine a policy document for the writer’s intention (Graham 2007b), and would not seek to speak for the subject of analysis (see Graham 2007a, p. 14). It is for this reason that those using discourse analysis with Foucault shy away from prescribing method, for no matter how standardised the process, the analysis of language by different people will seldom yield the same result. This is not seen as problematic for the aim of poststructural analysis is not to establish a final “truth” but to question the intelligibility of truth/s we have come to take for granted.

Although not “scientific” this approach can be a powerful analytical tool, particularly in an applied field such as education. Through the experience such analysis provides, it is possible to come to a different relationship with those truth/s which may enable researchers to think and see otherwise, to be able to imagine things being other than what they are, and to understand the abstract and concrete links that make them so. Ultimately, the value of poststructural work is intellectual and conceptual. The critical relationship to truth enabled through Foucauldian problematisation does not mean that there is no truth – it means that truth is always contingent and subject to scrutiny. Truth is no longer immutable and this opens the door to powerful possibilities for change. Ultimately, to be able to see truth as a kind of fiction, as something we busily construct around ourselves means that we can come to see “truth” as something less final; as something we can (re)make ‘little by little... [by] introducing modifications that are able if not to find solutions, at least to change the given terms of the problem’ (Foucault, 1994, p. 288).

Despite how poorly understood Foucault’s work has been (see O’Farrell, 2006), approaching truth as a “construction” does not result in relativism. Nor does the admission that truth is contingent leave us peddling mere “speculation”. Words on a page, utterances, symbols and signs, statements: *these* are the start and end point for the poststructural discourse analyst. If anything this is the most honest and ethical approach to the analysis of language for, as Barthes (1977a, p. 148) points out, “the unity of a text is not in its origin, it is in its destination”. The acknowledgment of such contingency is a profoundly ethical standpoint and the reluctance to

prescribe method reflects, not that “anything goes,” but the characteristic reticence of those “doing” discourse analysis within a poststructural framework to make claims to truth through ‘scientific’, ‘objective’, ‘precise’ methodologies. This again is not restricted to Foucauldian work, as Edwards and Nicoll (emphasis added, 2001, p. 106) demonstrate this same caution in discussing methodological possibilities in rhetorical analysis:

The different elements may be combined in a variety of ways to produce different types of analysis that focus on a particular range of practices and issues. *They are not part of a method to be applied, but resources in an interpretive art.*

A distinction between the prescription of scientific method and the development of methodological guidelines should perhaps be emphasized here. The formulation of “method” has traditionally been attempted to standardize research activity and to assist in the generalization of results. In the human and social sciences particularly, this has been done to lend “scientific” credibility to fields of study marred by the often perplexing inconsistency arising from human behaviour (Foucault, 1972). Such an objective, if the insights of the great “anti-theorists” of postmodernism (Thomas, 1997, p. 80) are to be respected, is an impossible ambition when it comes to the analysis of discourse and language, particularly with respect to a search for original meanings or personal agendas. This does not mean that language cannot be analysed, or that one cannot develop methods to approach this task. It simply means that one has to be clear about objectives, limits and, most importantly, what one is *doing*.

“Doing” Poststructural Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis consistent with a Foucauldian notion of discourse does not seek to reveal the true meaning by what is said or not said (Foucault 1972). Instead, when “doing” discourse analysis within a Foucauldian framework, one looks to statements not so much for what they say but what they *do*; that is, one question’s what the constitutive or political effects of saying this instead of that might be? As Foucault (1972, p. 134) argues, ‘there is no subtext’. The analyst’s job ‘does not consist therefore in rediscovering the unsaid whose place [the statement] occupies’ (p. 134). Instead, Foucault (Ibid.) maintains that ‘*everything* is never said’ and that the task is to determine, in all the possible enunciations that could be made on a particular subject, why it is that certain statements emerged to the exclusion of all others and what function they serve.

Such an approach distinguishes itself by interrogating what Foucault (1980a, p. 237) describes as, “the discourses of true and false... the correlative formation of domains and objects... the verifiable, falsifiable discourses that bear on them, and ... the effects in the real to which they are linked.” The objective is to explicate statements that function to place a discursive frame around a particular position; that is, statements which coagulate and form rhetorical constructions that present a particular reading of social texts. Incidentally, this includes all forms of signification: movement, behaviour, performance, gestures, art, symbols, text and so on. Elsewhere (Graham 2007a), I put an earlier draft of this analytic to work using literary theory to demonstrate *how* the use of particular discursive techniques in the production of meaning present a particular view of the world *and* prepare the ground for the “practices that derive from them” (Foucault 1972, p. 139). Building on this work here, I outline three important ideas from

Foucault's work – description, recognition and classification – as a guide for how one might approach poststructural discourse analysis using Foucault.

1. Description

In order for an object of discourse to be “produced”, it must first be definable in order to be locatable. Language is the tool through which people communicate ideas, and successful communication between individuals and especially groups of individuals relies on the definition and specification that language allows. In the English language, we have many words that all sound the same: e.g., Threw and through; and to, two and too. Placing these words differently can completely alter a sentence and the meaning of the exchange. Therefore, in written communication we depend on the spelling of these different words and the other words used alongside them to guide our understanding of what is being said. In oral communication we rely on context and our ability to comprehend. The more specific our language, the more accurate we can be in conveying and understanding meaning. That specification however, the *words* we use to describe *things*, is the mechanism through which we define and shape what Foucault often referred to as “objects of discourse”. Thus, the main aim of a Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis is to trace the relationship between words and things: how the words we use to conceptualise and communicate end up producing the very ‘things’ or objects of which we speak. It is my view based on a reading of Foucault that the foundational starting point of such an analysis would be to define and locate what he calls ‘statements’.

Making a Statement Foucault defines the statement as “[t]he atom of discourse” (Foucault, 1972, p. 80) but avoids defining it through any of the models borrowed from grammar, logic or analysis (Foucault, 1972). Instead, Foucault extracts the statement from “the simple inscription of what is said” (Deleuze 1988, p. 15) describing it, not as a linguistic unit like the sentence, but as “a function” (Foucault 1972, p. 98). The statement as ‘function’ can be theorised as a discursive junction-box in which words and things intersect and become invested with particular relations of power, resulting in an interpellative event (Althusser 1971; Butler 1990) in which one can “recognize and isolate an act of formulation” (Foucault 1972, p. 93). Figure 1 below aptly illustrates how this can occur.



Figure 1: Formulating the cultural “Other”

The above postcard advertising entertainment for a local council day features three circles that each headline the time and name of two main attractions: The Hooley Dooleys at 11am and Marcia Hines at 2pm. The third circle mentions “Local and Multicultural Acts”. At first glance this may not seem problematic. On stage throughout the day were performances by dance groups, numerous bands⁴ and performers, however, none of the bands were “flown in” for the event, which means that all of the bands were essentially “local”. The use of the word “local” is interesting in this case because one would assume it was being used to mark geographic identity (See Ibrahim, this issue). Placing the word “local” alongside “multicultural” (rather than, say, international) results in what Foucault calls an act of formulation; qualifying the third circle above as a “statement” appropriate for analysis.

In this example, the signifier “local” is acting as a euphemism for Anglo-Australian, naturalising the dominant group (see Graham & Slee 2008). Unfortunately, the signifier “multicultural” is assuming the use for which it is most often used in Australia: denoting “other culture”, “non-Australian” or “the people that live here who aren’t Australian” (or aren’t white). This statement effectively conjures the cultural/ethnic Other; identities that are obliquely referred to yet “everyone knows ‘who’ is being talked about” (Popkewitz & Lindblad 2000, p. 9). Anglo-Australian culture is not generally being referred to when someone is talking about the “multicultural”. For example in 2005 during the time of the Cronulla race riots, newsreaders referred to “carloads of ethnics coming up from Melbourne to join the cause”. In Australia, people not of Anglo-Western European appearance are often referred to as “ethnics” however, in denying that “Anglo-European” is itself a form of ethnicity, a cultural Other is produced and stubbornly maintained (Graham & Slee, 2008). This is not simply a matter of media ignorance as the following excerpt from an interview with an Australian academic will show:

Monash University's Centre for Population and Urban Research head, Bob Birrell, said Melbourne had much lower levels of ethnic concentration than Sydney.

Melbourne's northern suburbs had a significant number of immigrants and people of Middle-Eastern descent but its ethnic enclaves were not as big as in Sydney's southwest. "In Sydney, especially, more affluent **ethnics**, and to a greater rate non-**ethnics**, are moving out of those areas so the concentration grows," Dr Birrell said.

(Masanauskas & Mickelborough 2005, p. 1)

The effect of such discursive processes have been articulated more fully by McGrath (2008) who draws upon the discursive analytic described here to understand how a set of developmental scales used to program for and assess English language learners in Australian schools works to define "culturally competent" Australian citizens. McGrath augments this analytic using Foucault's concept of disciplinary power to understand how the national ESL Scales then function to produce and locate "culturally in/competent" students requiring remediation and cure. She develops a conceptual framework to illustrate how discourses and practices historically embedded in a White Australia consciousness intersect to produce notions of what it means to be "Australian;" subsequently reaffirming the exclusionary logic set out by the dominant discourse. Such an approach to discourse analysis can lead one back to and through the discursive markers paving the journey from linguistic profiling to ocular and theoretic recognition. This involves tracing the pathways between words and things and the processes of validation involved.

2. Recognition

According to Foucault (1972, p. 100), the statement is a "special mode of existence" which enables "groups of signs to exist, and enables rules or forms to become manifest" (Foucault 1972, p. 99). Thus, in theorising the tactics related to the production of psychiatric "truth" and the development of a power/knowledge specific to the human sciences, Foucault (1972, p. 86-87) looks,

to describe statements, to describe the enunciative function of which they are the bearers, to analyse the conditions in which this function operates, to cover the different domains that this function presupposes and the way in which those domains are articulated.

In doing so, he notes that "psychiatric discourse finds a way of limiting its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object – and therefore of making it manifest, nameable, and describable" (Foucault 1972, p. 46). He maintains that the construction of categories and description of disorders (such as the evolving descriptions within the American Psychiatric Association's manual *DSM-IV-TR*) serves to provide the human sciences with a locatable object of scrutiny (Foucault 1975). However, for an object to be locatable it must first be *recognizable* and that is the 'enunciative function of statements'.

Judith Butler (original emphasis, 1997, p. 5) declares that, "[o]ne 'exists' not only by virtue of being recognized, but, in a prior sense, by being *recognizable*." By this Butler (p. 2) refers not only to the act of being addressed or hailed, but to the simultaneous effect of a discourse which both "interpellates and constitutes a subject". Identities and categories exist prior to the subject, in effect, Butler (1997) argues, we "become" when interpellated through the prior power of language; that is, when we are described, we can then be "recognized" and classified. For the

discourse analyst using Foucault, the first step in understanding how “things” have come to be as they are, is to trace the processes involved in their constitution. This involves, as discussed in the previous section, the need to identify statements or articulations within a field of regulation that may function with constitutive effects. In order to understand how “words” become “things” in a Foucauldian sense, such an analyst would examine specific bodies of knowledge which, in validating certain statements build a discourse that reaffirms not only that particular perception of phenomena and the way it is described, but also outlines the specific and technical expertise required to deal with it.

3. Classification

Inherent to the medical account of childhood misbehaviour are procedures that outline ‘symptoms’ of neurological disorder and the processes by which such children can be identified and classified. The cultural description of a child’s behaviour as ‘impulsive’, ‘hyperactive’, or ‘inattentive’ builds the case for a medical assessment through which the doctor completes a 14 point checklist compiled using the diagnostic criteria for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), and compliant teachers and parents tick boxes on behavioural scales that indicate whether a child’s naughty behaviour is of “clinical significance”. Professional “recognition” of particular idiosyncrasies ensures that the child’s behaviour is properly classified and therefore, that the child is referred to the appropriate “expert”. Specialised treatment of the child’s disorder may then begin (see Graham 2007c). The question is: how does one trace the myriad discursive pathways involved?

In discussing Foucault’s interest in the statement, Deleuze (1988, p. 8) points to the constitutive properties intrinsic to it by imparting that a “statement has a ‘discursive object’ which does not derive in any sense from a particular state of things, but stems from the statement itself”, for a “statement always defines itself by establishing a specific link with *something else* that lies on the same level as itself... almost inevitably, it is something foreign, something outside” (original emphasis, Deleuze 1988, p. 11). Through the location and analysis of such statements, it becomes possible to isolate the “positivity” (Foucault 1972, p. 214) of a particular power/knowledge. Identifying and following discursive traces leads one back to the knowledge-domain upon which the statement relies for its intelligibility, at the same time revealing other artifacts or statements from that particular discursive formation which together, work to sustain the field from which they originate. In other words, mutually reinforcing discourses construct an associated field which:

... is made up of all the formulations whose status the statement in question shares, among which it takes its place without regard to linear order, with which it will fade away, or with which, on the contrary, it will be valued, preserved, sacralized, and offered, as a possible object, to a future discourse. (Foucault, 1972, p. 110 -111)

At this point I wish to return to my earlier discussion of the statement “Local and Multicultural Acts.” It is only through self-reinforcing discursive processes such as those I outline above, that it becomes possible in a contemporary liberal society with anti-discrimination legislation to

discriminate, marginalize and exclude – *and, for this to pass relatively unnoticed*. The validation of statements such as “Local and Multicultural Acts” through a wider cultural discourse that speaks of ethnicity as something Other, not only produces recognizable and racialised “ethnics” but ensures their classification and exclusion even more emphatically through what is arguably a contradiction in terms: *non-ethnics*. The term “non-ethnic” valorizes white Anglo-Australians as members of a natural order; further marginalizing citizens of non-Anglo European descent.⁵ In this way, discourse analysis using Foucault can help us to understand how, as Leonardo (in press, this issue) describes, “[r]acial hailing still occurs” and, perhaps more importantly, why “many of its subjects still turn around when their subjectivity is called upon to answer”. Discourse analysts drawing upon Foucault understand that discourse produces subjects as well as objects and key to understanding people’s actions is an appreciation of how discourse shapes their identities, beliefs, actions (see Graham 2009).

Foucault’s theorisation of the constitutive and disciplinary properties of discursive practices within socio-political relations of power is a demonstration of the postmodern concern with how language works to not only produce meaning, *but also particular kinds of objects and subjects upon whom and through which particular relations of power are realised*. Unlike Critical Discourse Analysis or CDA (Fairclough 2003; van Dijk 2001), discourse analysis using Foucault focuses less on the micro - the structural/grammatical/linguistic/semiotic features that *make up* the text - and more on the macro (Threadgold 2003); that is, what is “made up” by the text itself.

The aim of this form of analysis is to “try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects” (Foucault 1980b, p. 97) through the interrogation of discursive practices that both objectify and subjugate the individual. Objectification acts as a locating device; a mechanism of visibility (Deleuze 1992; Ewald 1992) that formulates how a “group is seen or known as a problem” (Scheurich 1997, p. 107). Once constituted as an object of a particular sort, individuals can be dispersed into disciplinary spaces within that “grid of social regularity” (Scheurich, 1997, p. 98) and from there, can become subject to particular discourses and practices that result in what Butler (1997, p. 358-359) describes as, “the ‘on-going’ subjugation that is the very operation of interpellation, that (continually repeated) action of discourse by which subjects are formed in subjugation.” In other words through the process of objectification, individuals not only come to occupy *spaces* in the social hierarchy but, through their continual subjugation, come to know and accept their *place*.

Conclusion

Stephen Ball (1995, p. 267) reminds us that “the point about theory is not that it is simply critical” and that theory in educational research should be “to engage in struggle, to reveal and undermine what is most invisible and insidious in prevailing practices.” Poststructural discourse analysis that draws on the work of Foucault is well placed to do this. In looking to the function of statements in discourses that work to (re)secure dominant relations of power (Nakayama & Krizek 1995) and the correlative formation of domains and objects (Deleuze 1988; Dreyfus &

Rabinow 1982; Foucault 1972), the poststructural discourse analyst certainly shares the Critical Discourse Analyst's concern as to the "relationship of language to other social processes, and of how language *works* within power relations" (Taylor 2004, p. 436). While these two approaches may offer different analyses, this simply confirms the assertion that "there will always be other perspectives from which to interpret the material under review" (Humes & Bryce 2003, p. 180) and the kaleidoscopic nature of language and meaning; certainly not that one analyses is any more 'true' than the other.

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¹ Here I am referring to the practice where Foucauldian notions are used but reference to Foucault is deliberately stricken from the reference list. It happens, and whilst it is described as "strategy" it really should be described as self-censorship.

² I use capitals here to denote CDA because arguably both approaches to discourse analysis are critical.

³ Just to complicate matters, Fairclough himself maintains that CDA is informed by the work of Foucault. The question for scholars then becomes: Is CDA appropriately Foucauldian (and does it want to be?) or is CDA somehow set apart from Foucauldian discourse analysis? And, if so, how and does this negate its resonance with

Foucault? Any definitive claim to “research findings” or similar claim to truth would not sit well with Foucauldian ideas.

⁴ The significance of the naming of “local and multicultural acts” first became apparent when watching a band play Brazilian music with carnivale dancers. These performers represented “multicultural acts”.

⁵ Born in Zimbabwe to Scots/Irish parents and raised in Dublin before emigrating to Australia in the 1980s, this author identifies as Celtic-Australian, not Anglo. However as an immigrant of white European appearance, I have noticed that my nationality is assumed to be “Australian” whereas this is rarely the case with new Australians of a darker skin tone. This realisation came home powerfully the night Sydney’s bid to win the Olympics was announced as successful. One in a group of young men called out “Bad luck Beijing!” to a man standing close by, who cheerfully replied, “No worries mate, it’s all good”. The exchange stopped the young men in their tracks as this man had a broader Australian accent than they did. It turned out that he was 5th generation Chinese-Australian. His ancestors had come to Australia during the Gold Rush in the 1800s and his claim to “Australian” heritage turned out to have deeper roots than either myself or any of the young men who had taunted him as a representative of “Beijing”.